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Administrative Law. Banki v. Fine, 224 A.3d 88 (R.I. 2020).
Pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act, the Rhode Island
Superior Court has general subject-matter jurisdiction and
equitable jurisdiction to hear appeals against state administrative
agencies. However, its judicial intervention is only appropriate to
review a final order, with the sole exception for interlocutory orders
being when review of the agency’s final order would be an
inadequate remedy. An order denying a motion to dismiss is not a
final order and the exception for interlocutory orders requires
showing that continuing the administrative process would be futile
or would make the requested relief ineffective. The appropriate
remedy for an incomplete or deficient record is to either remand to
the agency or order limited discovery.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On July 2, 2013, the Defendant, the Rhode Island Department
of Health (the Department), through the Investigating Committee
of its Board of Medical Licensure and Discipline, “made a finding of
unprofessional conduct” against Mohammed Banki, M.D., D.M.D.,
and Frank Paletta M.D., D.M.D. (the Physicians).1 On December
19, 2013, the Department made formal charges and scheduled an
administrative hearing.2 However, the Physicians’ discovery was
hindered by the Department’s failure to adequately comply with
several of the Physicians’ discovery requests, and so, on May 9,
2014, a hearing officer entered a conditional order of dismissal
against the Department unless it complied with the discovery
requests by May 14, 2014.3 Although the Department gave
responses for the discovery requests by the date ordered, on May
21, 2014, the Physicians moved to dismiss, alleging that the

1. Banki v. Fine, 224 A.3d 88, 91 (R.I. 2020). The Physicians are “both
medical doctors and dentists, but . . . their practice was primarily in the area
of dentistry.” Id. at 92 n.5.
2. Id. at 92.
3. Id.
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responses were inadequate.4 After a hearing, and another attempt
by the Department to satisfy the discovery requests, the hearing
officer denied the Physicians’ motion to dismiss in a written order
(the Order), concluding that the Department had obeyed the
conditional order.5
Following the denial of their motion to dismiss by the hearing
officer, the Physicians entered a complaint in Rhode Island
Superior Court pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act,6
arguing that the Order was final and as such, appealable.7 The
Department argued that the complaint should be dismissed
because the denial of the motion to dismiss was an interlocutory
order and not a final order that is appealable under the statute.8
The first hearing justice9 found that the Order was interlocutory in
nature and thus not appealable without satisfying the elements of
the exception provided in section 42-35-15(a) of the Rhode Island
General Laws.10
Next, the hearing justice found that the
Physicians failed to allege facts supporting why a future review of
a final agency order would fail to provide an adequate remedy in
the Physicians’ case.11 Finally, the hearing justice granted the
Department’s motion to dismiss the Physicians’ complaint without
prejudice to the Physicians’ seeking review after the Physicians had
“exhausted their administrative remedies.”12
After the Department’s motion to dismiss was granted, the
Physicians petitioned for writ of certiorari with the Rhode Island
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-15.
7. Banki, 224 A.3d at 92.
8. Id.
9. In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court consolidated two matters
that were each heard by separate justices in the Rhode Island Superior Court
who are referred to as the first hearing justice and the second hearing justice.
Id. at 92 n.7.
10. Id. at 92 (“[a]ny preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency act or
ruling is immediately reviewable in any case in which review of the final
agency order would not provide an adequate remedy” (quoting 42 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 42-35-15(a))).
11. Id.
12. Id. (emphasis added). The first hearing justice also ordered the Department to “withdraw the sealed administrative record and to retain custody
of it.” Id. at 92–93.
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Supreme Court.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari but
ordered that the case remain in Superior Court with a direction to
find (1) whether the Department complied with the conditional
dismissal order of May 9, 2014 and if not, (2) whether the
conditional dismissal order was self-executing.14 The second
hearing justice ordered that the Department provide the original
administrative record by July 26, 2016.15 As a result of the
Department’s failure to produce that record, the hearing justice
entered a conditional order of dismissal unless the record was
produced by August 3, 2016.16
On August 3, 2016, the Department notified the hearing justice
that the original administrative record had been lost and the
Department instead submitted an amended hearing record.17 The
hearing justice did not accept this amended hearing record and
“ruled that what had been submitted was not the certified
administrative record of the appeal.”18 Consequentially, the
hearing justice: (1) granted the Physicians’ motion to enter default
judgment against the Department, (2) denied the Department’s
motion to vacate the default judgment, and (3) dismissed the
Board’s original charges against the Physicians.19 At this stage of
the litigation, the Department also petitioned the Supreme Court
for certiorari, which the Court granted.20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

In this case, the parties each sought review of separate
Superior Court rulings.21 The Supreme Court conducted a de novo
review limited to questions of law regarding the first hearing
justice’s order granting the Department’s motion to dismiss the
Physicians’ administrative appeal, and the second hearing justice’s

13. Id. at 93.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The Department’s amended hearing record was a “certified administrative record entitled ‘Amended Administrative Hearing Record.’” Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 94.
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entry of default judgment against the Department.22 To begin, the
Court found that the first hearing justice incorrectly analyzed the
Physicians’ failure to meet the requirements of section 42-35-15(a)
as a jurisdictional issue rather than as a failure to state a claim, so
the Court found it necessary to clarify the law governing
administrative appeals.23 The Court explained that the Superior
Court of Rhode Island has general subject-matter jurisdiction and
equitable jurisdiction in the context of administrative appeals, and
therefore, the issue in this case was not whether the Superior Court
had subject-matter jurisdiction, but rather, if judicial intervention
under the facts of the case was proper.24 The Court determined
that the Superior Court did have subject-matter jurisdiction in this
case.25
To answer whether judicial intervention was appropriate
under the facts of this case, the Court reasoned that judicial
intervention by the Superior Court would be appropriate in two
circumstances: (1) to review a final order issued by an agency in a
case where the party adverse to the agency has “exhausted all
administrative remedies available” and (2) to review “[a]ny
preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency act or ruling . . . in
any case in which review of the final agency order would not provide
an adequate remedy.”26
First, regarding the issue of whether the Order was a final
order, the Court reasoned that a denial of a motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order because it does not “determine[ ] the rights or
obligations of the parties” but “establishes only that the case will
proceed to a hearing on the merits.”27 Therefore, the Court held
22. Id. at 93.
23. Id. at 94–95.
24. Id. at 95 (citing Chase v. Bouchard, 671 A.2d 794, 796 (R.I. 1996); La
Petite Auberge, Inc. v. R.I. Comm’n for Human Rights, 419 A.2d 274, 279 (R.I.
1980)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 95–96 (quoting 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-15(a) (alteration and
second omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Additionally,
the Court did not take up the issue of whether the Superior Court had equitable jurisdiction over the case because the Physicians did not “invoke” the Superior Court’s equitable jurisdiction in this case. Id.
27. Id. at 96 (citing Fayle v. Traudt, 813 A.2d 58, 61 (R.I. 2003)). The Court
also cited to the two-part test used by the United States Supreme Court to
determine when an agency order is a “final order” in the context of the
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that the Order was an interlocutory order, and not a final order.28
Finding that circumstance one was not present in this case, the
Court proceeded in its analysis to determine if circumstance two
was present.
Second, regarding the issue of whether the Order met the
exception to the bar on interlocutory appeal because a review of the
agency’s final order would be an inadequate remedy, the Court first
addressed the Physicians’ argument that continuing the
administrative process with inadequate discovery would render
review of the Order “futile.”29 The Court reasoned that the
Physicians failed to show how proceeding with inadequate
discovery would render as futile a future appellate review of the
Department’s final order.30 The Court also noted that the
Administrative Procedures Act, which is “analogous” to Rhode Island’s administrative procedures. Id. The test asks (1) whether the order is the “consummation” of the administrative agency’s process for making a decision and (2)
whether the order determined the parties’ “rights and obligations.” Id. (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
28. Id. at 96. Additionally, in response to the Physicians’ argument that
an “interlocutory order” can be a “final order,” the Court pointed out that for
an order to be “final” it “must not be of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature.” Id. (quoting Bennett 520 U.S. at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Court further clarified that section 42-35-12 of the Rhode Island General
Laws merely provides the requirements that must accompany a “final order”
but does not provide a legal definition for the term in response to the Physicians’ argument that the section did provide such a definition and that the Order included all of the elements required by the section. Id. at 96–97; see also
42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-35-12 (requiring that final orders “be in writing,” contain “findings of fact and conclusions of law,” and requiring that adverse parties “be notified either personally or by mail and be given “separate notice”
regarding “the appeal period and the procedure for filing an appeal”).
29. Id. at 97. The Court noted that “review of an interlocutory order is
appropriate only where further agency review ‘would be futile or would destroy
the effectiveness of the relief sought.’” Id. (quoting Almeida v. Plasters’ & Cement Masons’ Local 40 Pension Fund, 722 A.2d 257, 259 (R.I. 1998) (alteration
in original)). The Court also noted that this is the standard governing when a
court may review a final order before all administrative remedies have been
exhausted, but the Physicians did not dispute the use of this standard before
the first hearing justice. Id.
30. Id. at 97–98. The Court also pointed out that interlocutory orders may
be reviewed as part of the review of a final order. Id. at 97 (citing Greensleeves,
Inc. v. Smiley, 942 A.2d 284, 291 (R.I. 2007)). Therefore, if the Physicians were
to lose on the merits, they would be able to appeal prior interlocutory orders
they were aggrieved by, i.e., the Order denying the Physicians’ motion to dismiss. See id.
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Physicians may yet prevail in administrative proceedings against
the Department over the merits of the underlying charges—despite
their purported lack of adequate discovery.31 Therefore, the Court
concluded that in this case judicial intervention by the Superior
Court was inappropriate, affirming the first hearing justice’s
decision granting the Department’s motion to dismiss the
Physicians’ administrative appeal.32
Finally, the court proceeded in its analysis to consider the
Department’s argument that the second hearing justice went
beyond his discretion by entering default judgment against the
Department.33 Agreeing with the Department, the Court stated
that “lower courts . . . may not exceed the scope of the remand or
open up the proceeding to legal issues beyond the remand.”34 The
case was already remanded back to the Superior Court solely to
answer whether the Department complied with the May 9, 2014,
conditional order and whether that order was self-executing.35
However, the Court reasoned that entry of default judgment
against the Department was inappropriate to remedy the lost
administrative record because the second hearing justice should
have transmitted the case back to the Supreme Court without
resolving the issue or should have resolved the issue based on the
record he had.36 In any event, the Court indicated that ordering
remand to the agency or ordering limited discovery would be the
appropriate remedy to cure an incomplete or deficient
administrative record.37 Furthermore, the Court found that the
Physicians did not demonstrate the required showing that the
record was incomplete, but merely speculated that it was
incomplete because the index did not match the amended hearing
record.38 Therefore, the Court quashed the second hearing justice’s
31. Id. at 97–98.
32. Id. at 98.
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting State v. Arciliares, 194 A.3d 1159, 1162 (R.I. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
35. Id. at 100.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 98–99.
38. Id. at 100. The Court noted that the real issue was not whether the
Department could provide the “original” record, but rather it was whether the
amended hearing record that the Department provided was “complete.” Id.
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entry of default judgment against the Department and remanded
the case to the Superior Court specifically instructing that court to
remand the case to the Rhode Island Department of Health to carry
on with its hearing on the merits of the administrative charges
against the Physicians.39
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court laconically commented about
the age of this case and the delays it has faced while also
acknowledging a lack of any substantive developments regarding
the underlying charges.40 In its rationale, the Court made a twin
effort to reduce confusion and ensuing delays regarding
administrative appeals at the Superior Court level, and also to
balance the interests and rights of the litigants appealing orders of
state administrative agencies against the deference given to those
administrative agencies and the hearing records they produce. In
so doing, the Court identified four major points of law regarding
administrative procedure to elucidate in this case.41
To start, the Court acknowledged the need to clarify for the
lower courts that the Rhode Island Superior Court indeed has
jurisdiction over administrative appeals against state agencies and
that determining whether such an administrative appeal states a
claim upon which relief can be granted hinges on whether the
court’s judicial intervention is appropriate based on the facts of the
case.42 By eliminating any confusion in the lower courts, this ruling
helps prevent the error from recurring and thus helps prevent
unnecessary litigation or delays in the form of appealing the
error.43
The Court also noted that the Physicians did not allege that any particular
“relevant document[s] w[ere] missing” from the amended hearing record and
that they if they had done so, “then the second hearing justice could have ordered limited discovery or a remand to the [D]epartment to locate or provide
the missing documents.” Id.
39. Id. at 100–01. Wryly commenting that the age of this “hoary” case was
“approaching seven years” without hearing anything “substantive” regarding
the underlying charges against the Physicians, the Court underscored the need
to finish the administrative process “without further delay.” Id. at 101.
40. Id. at 100.
41. See id. at 94–100.
42. Id. at 94–95.
43. See id.
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Next, the Court explained that an order denying a motion to
dismiss is an interlocutory order and thus not a final order that can
be appealed.44 Without suggesting anything untoward about the
Physicians’ intent regarding their appeals, the Court’s ruling
effectively prevents similar appeals and ensuing delays in future
cases by rendering as frivolous the argument that a motion to
dismiss is a final order.45
Then, the Court made clear that the exception allowing review
of an interlocutory order requires showing futility in that
proceeding further with the agency would make the sought-after
remedy ineffective.46
This so-called finality rule prevents
premature review of intermediate orders while cases are still
developing at the administrative level to prevent delays, to prevent
flooding the courts with administrative litigation at a preliminary
stage, and to prevent wasting judicial resources on determining
preliminary issues that could have been “resolved or become moot
. . . at the administrative level.”47
Finally, with respect to incomplete or deficient administrative
hearing records, the Court highlighted that entering default
judgment against an agency is an inadequate remedy to correct an
incomplete record and explained that the appropriate remedy in
that case is to order remand to the agency or to order limited
discovery.48 Although the Court sympathized with the Superior
Court’s difficulty in correcting the lost administrative record, it
admonished the second hearing justice for exceeding his discretion
in this case.49 The Court expounded that curing an incomplete
administrative record by remanding to the agency allows both
adverse parties to participate in further hearings to develop the

44. Id. at 96.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 96–98.
47. See id. at 98 (quoting N. Kingstown Sch. Comm. v. Wagner, 176 A.3d
1097, 1099 n.3 (R.I. 2018)).
48. Id. at 98–99. The Court noted that it could not locate “any caselaw,
either in our own or federal jurisprudence, where an agency has been subject
to a default judgment for having lost the original administrative record.” Id.
Regarding limited discovery, the Court noted that it is appropriate when there
is a showing that a particular relevant document or piece of information was
missing, which there was not, in this case. Id. at 99-100.
49. Id. at 98–99.
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facts, balancing the competing rights and interests of
administrative agencies against their adverse litigants.50 In sum,
the Court, looking to its own relevant case law and to analogous
on-point federal case law, took a balanced approach considering
society’s interest in functioning administrative agencies, as well as
the rights and interests of those agencies’ adverse litigants.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the first hearing
justice, holding that the Order denying the Physicians’ motion to
dismiss was not a final order and holding that review of the Order
as an interlocutory order was inappropriate because it could be
reviewed after the Department issues its final order. Determining
that entry of default judgment against the Department was in
excess of the Superior Court’s discretion, the Supreme Court
quashed the second hearing justice’s order and remanded the case
to Superior Court, instructing that court to remand the case to the
Rhode Island Department of Health for further administrative
proceedings.
Richard Tavares

50. See id. at 99 (quoting Lemoine v. Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation
and Hospitals, 320 A.2 611, 614 (R.I. 1974)).

